Post by yanks on Nov 10, 2022 18:13:51 GMT
Battle at Fairfax Courthouse
March 10th, 1862
General McClellan had spent the better part of February and the first few days of March preparing his army for a planned operation against the Confederate fortress at Centreville. Strategically, this fortress needed to fall in order for the Union to open up the road to Richmond without having to go through other avenues such as the Peninsula. The Army of the Potomac, being the largest and best supplied in the Union, was expected to time an assault against Centreville from multiple angles and overwhelm the defenders. This plan was well thought out, well planned and seemed sound based on discussions in Headquarters, but it had one major flaw. It relied on the rebel forces to do nothing while they carefully maneuvered into position.
Receiving multiple reports on Federal movements, at first General Joseph E Johnston did nothing. The old defender of the South was seen sleepily walking through camp, inspecting works and otherwise going on as if he wasn't receiving reports of Federal activity. Eventually, however, he was spurred into ordering his men to work harder at improving the works just in case the Federals dared assail them. When General Stuart's cavalry in Fairfax Courthouse were pushed out a second time in as many days, this time permanently, the General did not deign respond. It was only through the reactions of his own commanders to is lax response did he recognize he had an opportunity to strike.
Looking at the map and the reports received, the Federals were marching through the Courthouse South but Fairfax seemed to be the main nexus of the Federal activity. The Confederates had a key advantage, which was three roads of approach to the Union positions while the Union were only able to use one road to maneuver into their own positions against Centreville. This created an opportunity for the Confederates to bring to bear its army against only a portion of the much larger Army of the Potomac. This vulnerability became clear to General McClellan as well and he ordered his IV Corps to quick march from Alexandria to Fairfax to reinforce the area.
Whether by providence or by sheer luck, McClellan's order to bring up the smaller IV Corp likely saved his army from a major defeat. He also had observers in the top of Church towers looking for signs of rebel activity. These were the first of several pivotal decisions that saved his army from utter disaster. Without the IV corps, the rebel army would have caught McClellan's force on the march, with one corps strung out on the road and another gathered and prepared to march out as well.
The Confederates marched quickly through the morning and General Longstreet was the first to arrive, but was ordered not to begin his attack until D.H. Hill was able to bring his division up to fight. This proved unfortunate for the rebels but extremely fortunate for the Federals. It took time for V Corp to shake itself out to a battle formation from the marching columns it was in. When the two divisions finally advanced on the Union forces, it became clear immediately that V Corp under General Porter was much larger than D.H. Hills own force and Hill's division immediately ran into trouble. As it began to slowly fall back, the planned reserve under A.P. Hill had begun to arrive and immediately were put into the line to support the flailing regiments. Meanwhile, General Holmes, who had the longest march, was finally seen on the horizon, prepared to strike from the rebel left flank. With IV Corps already pressed hard, there was a potential for collapse of the whole Federal line.
Faced with a choice of pressing home the attack on D.H. Hill or reinforcing Keyes' IV Corps, McClellan reverted to his old conservative self he was known for. He couldn't bring himself to gamble that he could break the rebel flank when his own flank was flailing. Luckily, he had General Sykes' division of well trained regulars available and he deployed them immediately - another major decision that would save his force from certain defeat. Sykes' men performed heroically, holding off a force much larger than its own with constant, crisp volleys. General Keyes' men, whom were already exhausted by this point and saw their rate of fire falling rapidly, summoned what little strength they had left to hold the line thanks to the inspiring presence of the regulars.
This bought time for I corps, which was strung out along the road, to return to the area and march across fields from one side of the field of battle to the other. Seeing that rebel regiments on their right (Union left) were routing with A.P. Hill plugging the gap with his rapidly approaching men and his own right flank (rebel left) barely holding on; General McClellan thought it prudent to deploy I Corp under McDowell to support his right. Despite the length of time it would take.
It was around this time that the advantage along the Confederate right (Union left) began to swing into the Confederate favor. Originally, Porter outnumbered D.H. Hill by a fair margin, but the addition of A.P. Hill swung the balance the other way - with the exception of the very large siege train backing Porter's V Corps. General Johntson ordered Holmes and Longstreet to slacken in their efforts so that the Confederates could focus their efforts on V Corps and the siege train. Before D.H. Hill was able to rally his routed regiments, General Johnston ordered his units forward in an attempt to break V Corp. This, combined with the timely arrival of General Stuart and over 4,000 troopers, broke the will of the Pennsylvania reserve regiments that were holding on by a thread. As if by design, the entire section of the line collapsed into a rout as General McCall lost all command and control over his lower moral, poorly trained men, designed for rear line duty.
Only though the heroic efforts of Morrell's large division and the siege train, did the Union flank hold long enough for daylight to wane and nightfall to take over. This was also where the Union inflicted the majority of its casualties on the Confederate forces. Walls of lead were thrown at the advancing rebel units, killing and maiming men by the dozen. Thousands of Confederate soldiers fell here, but eventually they succeeded and even managed to capture a handful of guns that couldn't evacuate.
On the other side of the field, Keyes' IV Corps finally collapsed and routed from the field, reinforced by McDowell's rapidly arriving men. Had the Confederates not shifted their weight from their left to their right, there is a good chance this flank would have been the one falling and at far less cost. However, by evening, it was General Johnston's army that held the field while McClellan's fell back several miles to Annandale. Casualties were very high, marking a new bloody phase of the war. Once all of their spoils were captured and wounded gathered, the Confederate army left the field, leaving the Union to gather what wounded still lived come the morning.
The first of many major battles of 1862 in the East was over. Not much had changed, but perhaps lessons learned will be applied and the next time a conclusive battle may be fought.